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Abstract 
Considering the relationship between the environment and morality, discussion of 
the matter of values is inevitable. Although there is no consensus on the intrinsic 
and instrumental characteristics of the value, the condition of talking about 
environmental ethics is that the environment carries not instrumental but intrinsic 
value. The problem of subjectivity of this value creates an ontological problem. 
Given that the value of what is valued depends on the preferences, interests, and 
attitudes of the valuers, it can lead to anthropocentric environmental ethics, which 
is an abusive approach style by environmental policymakers. On the other hand, 
the understanding that value is independent of the preferences, interests, and 
attitudes of the subject brings an objective approach but this makes it difficult to 
base environmental ethics on values and adds scientific aspects to environmental 
approaches. Scientific aspects are already discussed under some concepts such as 
sustainability, biodiversity, ecology, and environmental management. However, 
grounding these concepts on moral values and the formation of environmental 
ethics depends on emphasizing not only the scientific and objective but also its 
subjective side. This study explained the possibility of meeting the universality 
criterion in objective conditions despite the subjectivity of values because the way 
environmental ethics is adopted by everyone is only a universal environmental 
ethic. 
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1. Introduction  
We logically conclude that universality requires objectivity and that’s why the universal environmental ethics 
should be based on objective value-based moral norms. Objectivity is a necessary condition for the 
determination of universal principles that may be valid everywhere. However, value, in the most general sense, 
is the meaning that the aspiring and needing subject attributes to that object as a result of his or her relationship 
established with the object. By nature and its definition, it does not have the quality of objectivity by many 
moral philosophers, although those who think the opposite are in the minority. Accordingly, this general 
definition of value emphasizes the subjective side of the valuers. What we think would be a remedy for the sake 
of creating a universal environmental ethic is to be able to show that establishing objective moral norms is 
actually consistent with the subjective aspect of value. Before attempting to demonstrate this consistency, it is 
essential to clarify whether its value is intrinsic or instrumental among the requirements of talking about an 
environmental ethic. 
To take environmental ethics seriously is to adopt the idea that it is not instrumentally valuable but intrinsically, 
since the definition of instrumental value usually indicates the use or benefits of environment in terms of human 
welfare. That is, a thing is instrumentally valuable if it is good for the sake of something else, opens up a room 
for management ethics.  What is the reason of this, in this sense, is that the phrase "for the sake of something 
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else" clearly refers to any usefulness for human purposes. However, the possibility of talking about an 
environmental ethics requires intrinsically valuation of it in order that it can be "an ethic the beneficiary of 
which is the environment per se" [1]. John O'Neill, who is an environmental philosopher at Lancaster University, 
suggests a proponent definition of intrinsic value as "independent of any instrumental usefulness for limited 
human purposes" and defends that a thing is intrinsically valuable, "if it is an end in itself" [2]. Despite the idea 
about intrinsic value has been commonly shared by many environmental philosophers, there is no consensus on 
whether it is objective or subjective.  Some environmental philosophers defend value’s objectively taking place 
in nature whereas others take the side of subjective attribution of value to nature. The division between these 
claims is the main subject of this study. Addressing such a division is of great importance in terms of what the 
nature of environmental values should be. There are advantages and disadvantages in both claims. 
2. Is there really value in nature or of nature?  
Holmes Rolston III, who is known for his idea of objective value in environment, argues  in his essay “Value in 
Nature and the Nature of Value” that "a sentient valuer is not necessary for value" [3]; if not, we may err in 
looking for that value in subject’s experience. Worse, in addition to this subjectivist fallacy, if we think that 
valuers are only humans and their valuing completely depends on their choices, attitudes, and preferences, we 
also fall into the anthropocentric fallacy. Although certain beings are unconscious or insentient beings, they are 
holders of value even if there is no any beholder. Holding a value is a sufficient condition of its objectiveness. 
But is Rolston really right?  Like J. Baird Callicott, who is known as commentator of Aldo Leopold and as an 
important environmental philosopher, a subject valuer who can evaluate. The existence of value depends on the 
existence of subjects' evaluative attitudes. Think about plants which are intrinsically valuable and that value is 
objective, is there anything which matters to them? Although plants have a good of their own or an end in them, 
can we talk about a plant value? I guess nobody answers these questions with 'yes'.  
Another environmental philosopher, Y. S. Lo also suggests that values stem from the evaluative attitudes of 
humans. Since only human beings are the source of all values, no subject means no value. Nevertheless, Rolston 
and the other objectivists claim, by giving a reference to Routley's 'the last man argument', that such an 
understanding ultimately leads to the conclusion that World without humans has nothing of value since 
subjectivism entails non-humans are only instrumentally valuable. According to this argument, Routley (later 
Richard Sylvan) wants us to imagine that all humans are dead except a man. He, the Last Man, gives a decision 
that if he himself is coming to an end, he must take everything else with them, so the last man can destroy every 
living animal, plant, bacteria, etc. tries to (he has access to very powerful technology so he can achieve his 
goals).Would this last man think that if he was already going to die, the unmanned world would not be worth 
anything, and would he destroy it too, or over and above, would he not think he had value and destroy it? For 
Routley in his words “What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental 
grounds what he does is wrong”[4]. What Routley emphasizes by this thought experiment is not to come up 




                    World without humans                                                    World with humans  
 
Figure 1. The distinction between the object and the source of value 
 
According to Rolston, for the subjectivists, then, it would not be wrong for the last man to destroy the world. If 
only humans have the ability to create values, then World without humans would also be completely valueless 
or has no actual value. The Last Man has done nothing wrong. So then, can we talk about a value of a world in 
which nobody exists and know it? In order to eliminate the problem of the universality of subjective value and 
source of value 
 
object of value 
 HSD Vol. 3, No. 1, May 2021, pp.53- 57 
55 
to speak of the value of an unmanned world, Rolston points to the need to extend moral consideration to non-
human beings, and to a new ethic that nature has a value independent of our interests. This is not the primary 
aim of this study but I will continue to compare the objectivist account of intrinsic value with the subjectivist 
one by entering into details as needed. Well, does the last man argument success in defense of an environmental 
ethic for objectivists? No, rather, it fails due to their erroneous assumption that "subjectivism entails non-
humans have only instrumental value" [2]. Subjectivists point out that this assumption confuses the source and 
object of value. Namely, nature is the object of intrinsic value whereas human consciousness is the only source 
of values.  That’s why, nature is value-laden entity and human being just reveals this value. Callicott does not 
use the word 'object; rather, it uses the word 'locus' in order to indicate that all natural beings are to be valuable, 
"not in themselves but for themselves"[5]. This quotation actually briefs the answers of Callicott and those who 
think like him on such crucial questions objectivists ask as that ‘how will objective moral norms be consistent 
with the subjective aspect of intrinsic value’ and that ‘doesn't value of this kind lead to the problem of 
universality of itself?’  
To overcome these problems, ideal observer account of subjectivism about intrinsic value has been theorized 
by Lo who proposes that the universality of subjectivist account of intrinsic value can be revealed by an ideal 
observer.  
3. Ideal observer account  
The ideal observer solution provides a way of getting rid of moral solipsism and sheds the light of value on that 
world in which valuers never exist. As we know, moral solipsism is a radical idealism that reduces everything 
to the subject and accepts those subjects’ outside as the subjects’ designs. In order to reveal the universal 
subjective value theory, even if the existence of value depends on the subjects, the value must be independent 
of the evaluative attitudes of the subjects (remember the distinction between the object of value and the source 
of value). This account of subjectivism avoids facing such problems by considering that "if what is of value is 
what ideal observers would value, and if we assume that such ideal valuers would find the flourishing nonhuman 
earth valuable, then the actual value of the earth is guaranteed even if humans or other real valuers never arrive 
on the scene" [6]. Thereby, valued object doesn't need to be contemporaneous with the valuer. I will not explain 
what an ideal observer version of subjectivist value exactly is but just elaborate for the sake of the subject matter 
of this study. 
O'Neill and Lo developed their ideas about intrinsic value by giving some references to Hume. In particular, Lo 
concealed the problems with subjectivist theory of intrinsic value by extending moral questions about what 
things are intrinsically valuable to practical questions about dispositions of human beings, habits, and 
psychological capacities. His metaethical theory of intrinsic value is regarded as ontologically subjectivist since 
he defends that the existence of value depends upon the existence of subjects' evaluative characteristics. Since 
we are subjects with tendencies, habits, and psychological capacities, our dispositional characteristics prevent 
us from establishing a universal value. Nonetheless, it is not impossible to set such a theory anyway if we assume 
an ideal observer without tendencies, habits, and psychological capacities. Lo generally frames his solution 
called as the dispositional theory in a way that "X is (relatively/universally) valuable if and only if (some/all) 
subjects are disposed, under ideal conditions {C}, to give certain evaluative responses {R} towards X" [7].  
These ideal conditions may consist of "being impartial, rational, dispassionate, and well-informed about the 
thing under evaluation" [7]. Thereby, the frame reduces facts about values to facts about valuers' dispositional 
attitudes and it is neutral between universalism and relativism. In other words, once evaluating an object 
intrinsically, if everyone were under ideal conditions, it would be universally valuable; however, people's 
dispositional attitudes are evolutionary, cultural, and personal products. Therefore, we are unfortunately under 
less than ideal conditions and lack of reliable moral sentiments.  It is possible to create values and make them 
universal by means of cultivating, negotiating about, and converge in people's evaluative attitudes. In that way, 
we can reach at a common ground that only under ideal conditions we may have reliable sentiments which are 
the very decisive of moral norms from Hume's point of view. This conceptual analysis implicitly implies 
metaethical universalism, the view that morally good or bad things are determined by people's approval or 
disapproval dispositions under ideal conditions. Likewise, if what is valuable is what ideal observers will value, 
and assuming that those ideal valuers would value the non-human world, then the value of the world is 
established before and after people or other valuers arrive at the planet. Think of value of Saturn planet or value 
of a dead star in another galaxy in which valuers never exist. That is why valued object doesn't need to be 
contemporaneous with the valuer. 
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Well, if we consider the world we live in and us with tendencies, habits, and psychological mechanisms, how 
or where will the ideal observer be for this world? Lo argues that Humean value is both objective and subjective, 
i.e., to discover values means to create values. We are only subjects uncovering such values. As an empirical 
issue, we try to find out or create values to common all. Since our evaluative attitudes are malleable, it can be 
cultivated. That’s why, it is possible to create values and make them universal by developing, negotiating, and 
converging people’s evaluative attitudes. Thus, we can reach a common point where we can only have reliable 
moral sentiments, which are the determinants of morality from Hume’s point of view, only under ideal 
conditions. To illustrate, from Hume's point of view, justice as an artificial virtue is one of the created values.  
3.1. Justice as a universal value 
Now, it can be questioned why we aim at reaching universality through ideal conditions if ideal conditions are 
actually objective criteria while adopting subjectivist account. We can cite this as an example of what Hume 
calls an artificial virtue of justice. Not everyone may have benevolence in sufficient degree to be impartial, 
which is the reason justice is established. Lo states "if everyone, by nature, had a tender regard for everyone 
else, and pursued public interest naturally, then there would no longer be any jealousy or conflict of interests 
among people, which the rules of justice are supposed to resolve [...]" [7]. Not everyone’s understanding of 
justice would be different either. Nevertheless, the self-interested motive in a larger society gives rise society to 
dissolve without mutual understandings of public interests. That is why pursuing other interests and following 
the rules of justice becomes important for the members of a society. Hume says that "it will be for my interest 
to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me" [8]. 
It is certain that this is easy task in close relations; however, the more society grows, the more it is difficult to 
take others' interests into account. In a larger society, Hume introduced a sense of justice and injustice to the 
maintenance of the convention of it.  This sense indicates a natural inclination which gets people "to feel the 
sentiment of approbation/disapprobation towards the observance/violation of the rules of justice" [7]. Even if 
the sense of justice and injustice emerges via sympathy which is a natural psychological mechanism, "it is 
thereafter augmented and secured by the artifice of custom and education" [7].  
Hume’s sense of sympathy or “human sympathy [which he sees as a psychological mechanism] can thereby be 
transformed into bioempathy” [7] for the environment and extended to all members of the environmental 
community, just as it plays a role as a fundamental factor in establishing the virtue of justice. We humans, like 
all natural beings, are members of the same biotic community. I think that if our evaluative dispositions are 
cultivable, we can change the attitudes of people towards environment, and thereby constitute a new 
environmental ethics shared by the public at large. Like the virtue of justice, we can create some environmental 
virtues such as modesty and thoughtfulness. The sentiment of sympathy which Hume sees as a psychological 
mechanism may be expanded to all members of the biotic community. Like all natural entities, we human beings 
are also the members of the same biotic community.  
4. A different approach to the issue from John Rawls 
Like Lo, John Rawls who is the Harward social scientist, born in Baltimore, proposes the theory of justice which 
is the most upheld and put into practice today. His theory is such a theory that liberals cannot possibly dislike it 
because it claims that every person can achieve these principles of justice by exercising self-reflection under 
certain conditions. In other words, it does not derive its strength from religion or human nature; rather, it used 
social contract rules presented by Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes (even Kant). Rawls wrote the book A Theory of 
Justice which explains his famous principle of social justice. He presented two principles that must be read in a 
lexicographical way since the first principle is prior to the second principle. They are: 
 
“First; each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. 
Second; social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably 
expected to be everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all” [9]. 
 
So where did Rawls derive these two principles from? The main issue for him is to explain how to adopt such 
principles universally. Rawls offered a theoretical “veil of ignorance” according to which all rational players in 
the social game put themselves in the original position (i.e. the default position) and think under a veil of 
ignorance to reach the same conclusion. It means that they don’t know anything about themselves, their places 
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in society, their genders, their finances, etc. while thinking about justice. Nobody wants to maximize his 
benefits; everyone wants to maximize the situation of those in the worst situation in society. Denying any private 
information about the players themselves encourages them to get a general point of view that has a strong 
similarity with the moral one. “Moral conclusions can be reached without abandoning the prudential reasoning 
under certain procedural bargaining knowledge constraints.” In short, moral intuitions take their place to 
prudential judgments [9]. 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, I did not intend to clarify whether the intuition is primary for moral reasoning or vice versa; rather, 
I have tried to emphasize the possibility of universal environmental values which should be both intrinsic and 
subjective by nature for the sake of the environmental ethic in the arguments of Lo and Rawls in particular, and 
Callicott, Rolston, O’Neill in general. I believe that we can talk about an environmental ethic only if we establish 
a universal ethical system which needs not to be objective. The locus and the source of value is a very persuasive 
distinction made by Callicott in terms of its applicability and acceptability in defence of environmental ethics. 
We can say that to create a value is to discover that value in environment. However, the subjectivity of values 
does not prevent us from reaching a universal theory of environmental value. My general refences to the theories 
of Lo and Rawls evinces that both can serve in finding useful hints to establish a universal theory of 
environmental ethics. Accordingly, we are unaware of others' influences on our psychological capacities, 
tendencies and of our abilities to control them. If we know our evaluative dispositions, we are aware of the 
values made by others, and of the different dispositions we shaped. Since our evaluative capacities are malleable, 
we can change the attitudes of people towards environment, and thereby make a new environmental ethics 
shared by the public at large.  
Like the way Lo identifies ideal conditions in which these tendencies or capacities cannot influence anymore, 
or the virtue of justice, which Hume called artificial and which Rawls later attains as a result of prudential 
reasoning substituting later for moral intuitions under the veil of ignorance, we also identify other virtues to get 
out of this subjectivity and determine universal conditions. That is why both theories can open a door for an 
objectivist account of intrinsic value through ideal conditions introduced by it. However, this is not entirely an 
objectivist theory of intrinsic value as Rolston understands. Ideal conditions make intrinsic nature of objects 
possible to persist in the absence of an observer because value both objective and subjective; to be more implicit, 
the former depends on the latter. Actually, they are both compatible with and complementary to each other. To 
find out values means to create values and therefore, observer dependent is equivalent to object dependent. We 
are only subjects revealing these values. As an empirical matter, we try to discover or create values to common 
all. Since our evaluative attitudes are malleable, it can be cultivated.  
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